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STOCK "BUY-OUT" PLANS:
SELECTION AND DRAFTING
By WILLIAM P. CUNNINGHAM*
Stock "buy-out" plans, funded by life insurance, have
long been popular as a way of overcoming difficulties that
arise when a stockholder in a closely held corporation dies.
But like other devices in the estate planning field, such
plans need periodic reappraisal in the light of developments
in the tax law. Because of their widespread use and the
delicacy of their tax aspects, these plans have received a
good deal of attention in legal periodicals.' This article has
three aims: to present the current status of the tax aspects
of such plans; to serve as a practical guide in the choice of
the type of plan to use; and to suggest points to consider in
the drafting of the plan selected.'
There are several reasons why this is a good time for
lawyers and other business advisers to take a new look
at the stock "buy-out" plan area. The 1954 Internal Revenue
Code has been around long enough to have acquired some
seasoning. Final income tax and estate tax regulations
have been issued for those sections of the Code that are
pertinent to the area. Moreover, the two year storm in the
Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals over constructive
dividends that for a time threatened the tax feasibility of
the stock redemption type plan has now subsided.'
* A.B. 1944, LL.B. 1948, Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Maryland School of Law.
1 FRIEDMAN, BuY AND SELL. AGREEMENTS: A REvIrw AND A NEw LooK
(N.Y. Univ. 15th Annual Institute on Federal Taxation, 1957) 1053;
Strecker, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements: Tax Problems in Drafting, 15
Wash. & Lee 18 (1958); Swados, Death and Nonsense: The Decline and
Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 189 (1957) ; Note, The Use
of Life Insurance to Fund Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Busi-
ne8s Interest at Death, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1958) ; and Wolf, Primarily,
The Tax Considerations In Making The Cr08s-Purchase Vs. Stock Redemp-
tion Decision: And The Present Muddle, The Daily Record, Baltimore,
December 16, 1957.
2 This article is limited to the use of "buy-out" plans with a corporate
business. Similar plans are used with partnerships. For discussion of those
aspects of such plans that are peculiar to the partnership situation, see
Samuels, Funding Partnership Buy-and-Sell Agreements with Life Insur-
ance, 35 Taxes 857 (1957), and Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 697-702 (1958).
8 The storm began with the Casale case in September, 1956 [Oreste Casale,
26 TC 1020 (1956)1, and ended in March, 1958 with the Tenth Circuit's
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FEATuIm OF THE Two TYPES OF PLANS
Before discussing the nature and effect of these tax de-
velopments, it may be helpful to outline briefly the chief
features of the two types of plans most commonly used.
These two types are: (1) the "cross-purchase" plan, where-
in each owner of stock purchases insurance on the lives of
the other owners and agrees that the survivors will pur-
chase with the insurance proceeds the stock interest of any
deceased owner; and (2) the "stock redemption" plan,
wherein the owners of stock and their corporation together
agree that the corporation will purchase insurance on the
lives of the owners and the corporation will redeem the
stock interest of any deceased owner with the policy pro-
ceeds. One of the most difficult planning decisions for law-
yers and business advisers is making the choice between
these two types of plans.
To illustrate further the features of each type of plan,'
let us assume a situation where A, B, and C own a business
corporation with a net worth of $100,000; 1000 shares are
outstanding, A owning 400 shares, B and C each owning 300
shares.
The cross-purchase plan would require for full funding
$100,000 face amount of life insurance in six separate poli-
cies, each party to the agreement owning a policy on the
life of the other two parties.5 A, B, and C would enter into
an agreement wherein each party would promise to pay
the premiums on the policies he owns, and in the event of
the death of either of the other parties would purchase
stock of the decedent at a price to be determined under
the agreement and it would be agreed that the estate would
reversal of Sanders v. Fox, 253 F. 2d 855 (10th Cir., 1958). The rash of
comments that appeared during the storm indicated the concern felt by the
tax bar. See, Mannheimer and Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements -
The Prunler and Sanders cases, 35 Taxes 567 (1957) ; Sneed, A Defense of
the Tam Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 Cornell L. Q. 339 (1958) ;
Levine, More on Casale: Decision was wrong because there was no sever-
ance of corporate property, 6 J. Taxation 289 (1957) ; Lawthers, Prunier
offers no threat to a sound insured buyout plan, 7 J. Taxation 2 (1957) ;
and Lawthers, Prunier reversed: no income to stockholders from premiums
paid by corporation, 8 J. Taxation 12 (1958).
'A number of excellent sample agreements are available to the drafts-
man. See 1 RASKIN AND JOHNSON, CUBRRNT LEGAL FOumS WITH TAx
ANALYSIS (1957), Forms 3.75 to 3.78 (cross-purchase type agreements) and
Forms 3.80 and 3.80A (stock redemption type agreements) ; CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING (2d ed. 1956) 774-791; and SHATTUCK AND FARR, AN ESTATE
PLANNER'S HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1953) 60-78, Form X (p. 470), Form XI
(p. 498).5 A would take out $15,000 of insurance on the life of B and $15,000 on
the life of C. B would 'take out $20,000 on A and $15,000 on C. C would take
out $20,000 on A and $15,000 on B.
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sell the stock at such price. There are a number of possible
methods for determining the selling price of the stock.'
The agreement should include restrictions on the sale or
other disposition of the stock during the lives of the par-
ties." There should be a provision giving the survivors a
right to purchase those policies on their own lives owned
by the decedent's estate; for instance, if A dies, owning
policies on the lives of B and C, B and C should have a right
to purchase these policies from A's estate. It is often ad-
visable to have a trustee a party to the agreement, to hold
the policies and the stock and to administer the agreement
on the death of a party.8 The usual tax consequences flow-
ing from such a cross-purchase agreement are that the
premium payments on the policies are not deductible by
anyone, the insurance proceeds are not taxable to the sur-
vivors, whose tax basis for the stock they get from the
decedent's estate is its cost to them, and the decedent's
estate includes the stock owned at death at the value fixed
by the agreement and also its unmatured policies on the
survivors' lives at their current value.
In a stock redemption type plan, an agreement would
be entered into by A, B, C and the corporation. The cor-
poration would take out a $60,000 policy on the life of A,
a $45,000 policy on the life of B, and a $45,000 policy on the
life of C; that is, altogether $150,000 of insurance in three
separate policies.' The corporation would be the owner of
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the various pricing methods, See
Forster, Valuing a Business Interest for the Purpose of a Purchase and
Sale Agreement, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 325 (1952). One method that will often
be satisfactory is to provide that the parties to the agreement periodically
stipulate the value of the stock, along with a proviso that if no such stipula-
tion has been made within a given period of time, the value should be
determined by means of an independent appraisal. For such a clause, see
CASNER, op. cit., 8upra, n. 4, 786. See also O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer
of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 773, 806 (1952). Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F. 2d 482 (D.C. App.
1957) shows that there are dangers in an agreement that merely provides
for periodic reappraisal by the parties without any provision as to the con-
sequence of their failure to do so.
7 Restrictions may sometimes involve difficulties under the state law
rules on unlawful restraints on alienation; for full discussion, see O'Neal,
ibid., 777-785. The clause used in CASNE , Op. cit., supra, n. 4, 779 ("Alterna-
tive 1") is a good way to handle the lifetime restriction.
8For the advantages of having a trustee and for suggested trust pro-
visions, see SHATTUCK AND FARR, 10c. cit., supra, n. 4. See also 1 RASKIN
AND JOHNSON, Op. cit., supra, n. 4, Forms 3.75, 3.76 and 3.78.
9The amounts indicated are approximate: mathematical precision is
difficult and not practical, anyway, since the future value of the stock to
be redeemed can only be estimated. The point to be noted is that an in-
creased amount of insurance is necessary for full funding under the stock
redemption type plan chiefly because the insurance proceeds - a corporate
asset - increase the value of the stock to be redeemed. This problem is dis-
cussed further, infra, p. 282 and p. 285.
19581
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and the beneficiary under all the policies and would agree
to pay all the premiums. The corporation would also agree
that in the event of the death of a stockholder it would
purchase his stock at a price to be determined under the
agreement; and it would be agreed by the parties that the
estate of the decedent stockholder would sell at such price.
There should be restrictions on the sale or disposition of
stock by the individual parties during their lives. On ter-
mination of the agreement, each individual party should
have an option to purchase the policies on his own life
owned by the corporation. The usual tax consequences
flowing from such a stock redemption agreement are that
premium payments on the policies are not deductible by
anyone, the insurance proceeds are not income to the cor-
poration, the estate of the decedent stockholder includes
its stock at a price fixed under the agreement, the surviv-
ing stockholders' cost basis for their stock remains the same,
and there is no dividend tax on either the decedent's estate
or on the survivors.
These stock "buy-out" plans have been used extensively,
and the life insurance companies have done a good job in
educating the public on their advantages. But before such
a plan is adopted it is important to make sure that it is
right for the situation.10 Perhaps the business should not
be continued on the death of one of the active owners. A
liquidation of the business, a sale of the business, or a
merger with a larger firm may be the wisest plan." Or,
perhaps the principal stockholder wants his family to retain
his interest, with a son taking over on his death."
On the other hand, if the parties want to have their
stock interest sold on their death, and if it is practical,
businesswise, to have the survivors continue the business,
then there are real advantages in a stock "buy-out" plan,
both to the decedent stockholder's estate and to the sur-
10 See Tremayne, Estate Planning for the Man with a Business, 1955
Wash. Univ. L. Q. 40.
1 See Hellerstein, Mergers, Taoes and Realism, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 254,
257 (1957).
A recapitalization of the corporation, creating non-voting preferred
stock for the non-active children of the principal stockholder, or the setting
up of a trust to manage the business may be indicated. See CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING (2d ed. 1956), 776. §6166 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, added
by the "Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958" (enacted September 2,
1958), 15 CCH St. Fed. Tax Rep. #37, 756 (Aug. 20, 1958) provides for
spreading payment of the estate tax on close corporation stock over a ten-
year period. This recent statutory change may stimulate more frequent
use of arrangements other than the stock "buy-out" plan. It should be
noted that this optional extension of the time of payment is not available
where the decedent's stock interest is sold or redeemed under a "buy-out"
plan [§6166(h)].
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vivors.3 The decedent stockholder's estate is assured that
there will be cash available for the purchase of its stock at
a price determined with a minimum of haggling and delay,
and based on a going concern valuation rather than a liqui-
dation valuation. Survivors acquire the decedent's stock
for merely the cost of the premiums on the policies on his
life and the possibility that a stranger or the family of the
decedent stockholder will have to be accepted in the man-
agement of the business is avoided. The business gains
greater stability; its relationships with its creditors and
with its employees are improved.
ESTATE TAX VALUATION
Another advantage of stock "buy-out" plans is that they
can fix the value of stock for estate tax purposes. Valua-
tion of a stock interest in a close corporation is one of the
most troublesome tasks faced by an executor and his law-
yer. If the value of the estate's stock is -fixed by such a plan,
there will be one less headache in the administration of the
estate. But to achieve such a result demands more than
merely an agreement with a pricing formula.
On the basis of the final Estate Tax Regulations, 4 and
the cases to date, 5 there is reasonable certainty that the
valuation will be frozen by the agreement if (1) the agree-
ment is a bona fide business arrangement, (2) the estate
of the decedent is obligated to sell its stock at the price de-
termined under the agreement and the survivors (the cor-
poration in the case of a stock redemption type plan) are
obligated to buy, or at least have an option to buy, at such
price, and (3) the agreement contains a binding restriction
against stockholders selling stock during their lives at a
price higher than the agreement price, or otherwise dis-
posing of stock without the consent of the other parties to
the agreement.'6 Without these three characteristics, al-
"a See Tremayne, supra, n. 10; SHATrTUCK AND FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S
HANDBOOK (2d. ed. 1953) 70; and 1 BowE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION
(1957), 495-7.
11 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-2(h) (1958), CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. #175,
p. 36 (June 23, 1958).
I For discussion of the cases, see FRIEDMAN, BUY AND SELL AGREEMENTS:
A REVIEW AND A NEW LOOK, (N.Y. Univ. 15th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation,
1957) 1068-1077; Swados, Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the
Buy-Sell Agreement, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 189, 200-206 (1957), and Note, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 687, 690-695 (1958).
11 In Baltimore National Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642, 654
(D.C. Md., 1955), Thomsen, C. J., thoroughly discusses the problem and
concludes:
"The present and proper rule is that the specified price Is not con-
trolling for estate tax purposes unless the restrictive provision (1)
1958]
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though the agreement price will lose its conclusive effect,
usually the plan will still have the effect of lowering in
some degree the estate tax valuation.17
A comparison of the final version of the Estate Tax
Regulations with the proposed version reveals a consider-
able modification in the Government's position (or at least
in the outward manifestation of that position). The pro-
posed Regulations' s indicated that a right of first refusal
in other parties to the agreement would not be a sufficient
restriction on sale during life. In the final Regulations
this reference to a first refusal restriction was deleted. Cer-
tainly where such right of first refusal is accompanied by
a price-fixing provision it should be a sufficient restriction.
In another change, instead of stating the requirement that
there be "full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth" for all agreements, the less onerous phrase
- "bona fide business arrangement" - was substituted,
together with the warning that the agreement not be "a
device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects
of his bounty for less than an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth".
The most substantial change in the final version of the
Regulations was the complete elimination of proposed
Regulations Section 20.2042-1(c) (6). This paragraph had
suggested that the agreement price under a stock redemp-
tion type plan would not be binding unless the proceeds of
the insurance policies were reflected in the agreement price.
Of course, the elimination of this requirement in the Regu-
lations does not indicate the Government will no longer
consider this aspect important; it merely indicates that it
is not yet ready to take a firm position on the point.
Whenever the agreement price turns out to be much less
than the value of a deceased stockholder's stock at his death,
the bona fides of the agreement still will be questioned.
And, of course, if a family-owned corporation is involved,
there is the immediate suggestion that the agreement has
been used to avoid an estate tax on what amounts to a be-
quest to the related surviving stockholders. 9 As the pro-
prevents transfer of the shares during the holder's life at a figure
higher than the specified price, and (2) grants an option to purchase,
or requires a transfer, at that price on the shareholder's death."
-Ibid., 655.
"8Proposed Reg. §20.2031-2(h) (1956), 21 Fed. Reg. 7850.
"Even when the stockholders are not related and have bargained at
arm's length, if it can be shown that they deliberately devised a price
formula that would give the survivors stock worth more than the purchase
price, it may be argued by the Government that the stockholders were in
effect wagering on the order of their deaths. Generally a wagering gain is
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posed Regulations indicated, a common way in which this
disparity between price and value occurs is where the pric-
ing formula under a stock redemption type agreement
ignores the cash surrender value of the policies owned by
the corporation under the plan and the proceeds of those
policies maturing at the time the redemption is to take
place. Thus, it is especially important that these elements
of value be considered in the pricing formula whenever a
binding estate tax valuation is sought and the corporation
is family owned.
Frequently stock "buy-out" plans provide that the price
should be the stipulated price or the amount of insurance
proceeds on the decedent stockholder's life, whichever is
higher. If upon the death of a stockholder the full insurance
proceeds are paid to his estate for stock actually worth
much less, certainly the Government will be happy to use
the price paid for the stock as its estate tax valuation. More-
over, such a provision has little to recommend it as a matter
of fairness between the stockholders. 0 A tax danger exists
when such a provision is used in a stock redemption type
plan, for it casts doubt on the legitimacy of the corporate
investment in the policies. It seems odd that the corpora-
tion should agree to pay more to to a decedent stockholder's
estate for its stock than its fair value.2'
When a conventional stock "buy-out" plan is employed
with all incidents of ownership as to the insurance policies
ordinary Income to the recipient. In reply, the taxpayer may argue that
the survivors' benefits when they win on the wager are not yet realized
since they are merely acquiring a stock Interest at a bargain price and
that taxing their gain must await the survivors' disposition of their stock.
Bargain purchases, however, have been taxed at the time of purchase in
other situations where the existence of the bargain was due to some income-
producing factor, such as "compensation" in the case of an employee's bar-
gain purchase; see Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956) or "divi-
dend" In the case of a stockholder's 'bargain purchase, see Treas. Reg.
1-301-1(j) (1955). Here, the winning of the wager might be held to be a
sufficient income-producing factor.
2 Such a provision may have some utility when the parties want a low
price on any inter vivo8 sale but a high price on death. For Instance, the
parties may want a low price on inter vivos sale both because It will dis-
courage an owner from withdrawing from the business and because no
funding will be available from the insurance to cover the purchase price,
and yet they also may want the estate of any deceased stockholder to have
the benefit of the Increased value at death of the policies on his life. A low
stipulated price with the proviso that at death the price will be no less
than the Insurance proceeds achieves in a rough way such objectives.
"1The lower courts in the Prunier and Sanders cases (discussed, infra,
pp. 296-298) were prejudiced against the taxpayer because of the use of
such a pricing provision, and even though both cases were reversed, such a
provision may have an adverse effect in the accumulated earnings tax area
(infra, p. 290) and in the dividend treatment of redemption area (infra,
p. 288).
1958]
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in the proper persons, the decedent's estate will not be
forced to include for estate tax purposes both the value of
the stock interest and also the insurance proceeds to be used
in its purchase. The "incidents of ownership" test in the
1954 Code, governing the taxability of insurance proceeds
under the estate tax, has virtually eliminated this possi-
bility - once thought to be a serious tax danger.22
FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE CHOICE OF A PLAN
Choosing the best type of plan for a given situation in-
volves weighing a number of factors. A comparison of the
respective tax brackets of the corporation and the indi-
viduals concerned is an important factor - one that is
often neglected. Since in a cross-purchase agreement the
individuals pay the premiums while in a stock redemption
agreement the corporation pays the premiums, the type
that is the cheaper tax-wise depends chiefly on the respec-
tive tax brackets of the corporation and the individuals.
If the individual stockholders are not employees and thus
can get money out of the corporation only by way of divi-
dends, the stock redemption plan is the cheaper. If both
the corporation and the stockholders are in the 52 % bracket
and the stockholders can readily take money out of the
corporation by way of salaries, the tax cost of each plan
would be approximately the same. If, however, the corpo-
ration is in a 52% bracket and the stockholders are in
brackets lower than 52%, again assuming that the stock-
holders can get money out by way of salaries, the cross-
purchase agreement would be the cheaper plan. Of course,
some stockholders may be in high tax brackets while others
are in low ones, and some stockholders may be employees
and others not. In such cases there will be conflicts of in-
terest between the stockholders as to the type of plan that
should be used. Where stockholders can not withdraw cash
out of their corporation by way of salaries or where they
have individual tax brackets above 521%, the stock redemp-
tion plan generally achieves a much desired result; that
is, it gets cash out of a closely held corporation without
the payment of a "double tax" on the corporate earnings
withdrawn.23 This consideration may be what is chiefly
responsible both for the popularity of the stock redemption
type plan and for the Government's hostility to it.24
' For situations where the danger still exists, see Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
687, 694-5 (1958).
Ibid., 702.
2A See discussion, infra, p. 292.
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In several respects, the cross-purchase type plan is more
favorable than the stock redemption type. In the first
place, less insurance is required to fund fully a cross-
purchase plan than a stock redemption plan. In fairness
to the older stockholders, and to assure that the conven-
tional tax consequences will apply,25 the method for fixing
the price of the stock of a decedent stockholder under a
stock redemption plan should recognize the proceeds of
the insurance on the decedent's life as an asset of the busi-
ness on the date of his death. To take the most extreme
situation, if the net worth of a business equally owned by
A and B is $100,000, it would take $200,000 face amount of
insurance owned by the corporation to fund the agreement
fully.26 Under a cross-purchase plan, on the other hand, a
total of $100,000 face amount of insurance would be suffi-
cient. The greater the number of individual stockholders
involved in the plan, the less difference there will be in
this respect between the two types of plans.2 7 The cross-
purchase plan has a further advantage over the stock re-
demption plan in that the cash surrender value of the in-
surance policies devoted to the plan will not be available
to the business creditors in the event of the corporation's
bankruptcy.
Another advantage of the cross-purchase type of plan
is that the survivors obtain a tax basis for the decedent's
stock interest equal to the price they pay for it, while under
See supra, p. 282.
"For the sake of simplicity, the cash surrender values of the insurance
policies have been ignored. On this assumption, upon the maturity of the
$100,000 policy on the decedent's life the total net worth of the corpora-
tion will increase from $100,000 to $200,000. Thus, to redeem the decedent's
half interest In the corporation, $100,000 is required; and to fund the plan
fully the corporation needs a $100,000 policy on each stockholder.
21 To recognize this "pyramiding" of the amount of insurance required
under a stock redemption plan involves serious practical problems. Often
a small corporation will not have sufficient extra working capital to pay
premiums on the amount of insurance theoretically required. The use of
low cost term insurance is one way to keep down the cost of the plan.
Another approach Is to forego full funding of the plan. With partial fund-
ing, though the agreement price would reflect the increase in net worth
arising from the maturity of the insurance, the agreement would provide
for spreading over a period of years payment of so much of the price for
the decedent's stock as exceeded the insurance proceeds available on his
death. Another common practice is simply to ignore the Increase in value
resulting from the maturity of the Insurance. This is unfair to the older
stockholders since the value of the matured policy will then inure solely
to the benefit of the survivors, even though the insurance premiums have
been paid out of corporate funds equitably belonging to all the stock-
holders. The older stockholders may be willing to make this sacrifice so
that the plan will be cheap enough to be feasible. See Note, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 687, 689 (1958). The deliberate setting of a low price, however, may
create tax difficulties, particularly in the family-owned corporation situa-
tion. (See, supra, p. 282, and infra, n. 88.)
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a stock redemption plan the survivors do not get any in-
crease in the tax basis of their stock interest on the redemp-
tion of the decedent's stock by the corporation. To put the
point more accurately, the insurance proceeds under a stock
redemption plan will add value to the survivors' interest
in the business, without any increase in the survivors'
basis, while in the cross-purchase plan the insurance pro-
ceeds will be added to the survivors' tax basis in step with
the increased value of their stock interest. This disadvan-
tage of the stock redemption plan may be significant if
some of the individuals involved are likely to sell out their
interests during their lives. If a survivor does have to sell,
however, the low tax basis will mean an extra tax at only
capital gain rates. There is also the chance that such a tax
may be avoided altogether by reason of his own death,
which will give his estate a stepped-up basis for his stock.
On the other hand, in some respects, the stock redemp-
tion plan is the more favorable type. Psychologically, a
stock redemption plan often seems more attractive to stock-
holders because the premiums do not come out of their own
pockets. Even when, because of respective tax brackets,
the cross-purchase type of plan may be less costly tax-wise,
the stockholders often will be more concerned about avoid-
ing a drain on their personal budgets. Furthermore, when
the corporation is paying the premiums there is more cer-
tainty that the policies will stay in force. In a cross-pur-
chase plan, there must be a continual check on the stock-
holders to make sure that each is keeping up his premium
payments. Moreover, in a cross-purchase plan, the younger
men own policies on the older ones, which means they pay
higher premiums. This is fair all around since "actuarially"
they are getting what they are paying for; the younger
men, however, often have the feeling that they are paying
more than they should and thus prefer a plan where the
business pays all the premiums.
Despite its liberalization in the 1954 Code,2 the trans-
fer for value rule still favors the stock redemption type
plan. Under a stock redemption plan, when a stockholder
dies there is no need for a transfer of existing policies.
Moreover, under the present version of the transfer for
value rule, it is possible to put into effect a stock redemp-
tion plan using existing policies without any trouble from
2 I.R.C. of 1954, §101(a) (2), the effect of which is to make the insur-
ance proceeds taxable when the policy has been transferred for value.
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this rule.2" With respect to a cross-purchase type plan, how-
ever, existing policies can not be so exploited, and, because
of the rule, when a stockholder dies it is not practical for
a survivor to buy from the decedent's estate the policies
the estate owns on the lives of the other survivors. Of
course, in most cases, it will be possible for the survivors
to purchase additional insurance, and the estate can either
sell the policies it owns to the insureds or to the corpora-
tion, or else cash them in. It is when a survivor has become
uninsurable that this transfer for value rule is most irk-
some, but even then there are ways to keep a "buy-out"
plan in full effect.8 0 Nevertheless, it would be a welcome
legislative change if the exceptions to the transfer for value
rule8 were expanded so that policies could be transferred
as freely between stockholders in a close corporation as
they presently can between partners.
PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO STOCK REDEMPTION PLANS
The pros and cons already discussed are still less than
the full picture needed to make an intelligent choice of the
best type of plan for a given situation. There are a number
of special problems peculiar to the stock redemption type
of plan that should be examined.
In the first place, the workability of a stock redemption
plan, and in some states even its validity, depends on
whether the applicable corporation law permits such re-
demptions. 2 Although most states provide that a corpora-
tion may purchase its own shares only out of surplus,8 3 this
usually does not present serious difficulties. The insurance
proceeds themselves will often produce sufficient surplus.
Moreover, it is usually possible to produce sufficient sur-
plus through a statutory reduction of capital.84
2 See FRIEDMAN, BUY AND SELL AGREEMENTS: A REVIEW AND A NEW LOOK
(N.Y. Univ. 15th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation, 1957) 1066.
0 See 1 RABRIN AND JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS
(1957) Form 3.78 for "sinking fund" provisions to protect the uninsurable
stockholder. The conversion of a cross-purchase plan into a stock redemp-
tion plan may in some situations provide a solution to this difficulty.
8 I.R.C. of 1954, §101(a) (2) (B).
See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corpora-
tion8: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
See, e.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, §32(b) (3).T See, e.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, §34 and §36(b). As to the use in
Maryland of a statutory reduction of capital as a way out of such diffi-
culties, see BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE, (Rev. ed.,
1953), §49, fn. 14. See also Kraft v. Rochambeau Holding Co., 210 Md. 325,
123 A. 2d 287 (1956). See 1 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS
WITH TAX ANALYSIS (1957), Form 3.80A for a clause covering the problems
of an insufficient surplus.
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A more troublesome problem concerns the tax effect
of the redemption on the estate of the decedent stockholder.
Section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
seeks to separate redemptions to be treated as exchanges
and redemptions to be treated as dividends, and Section
318, which provides rules on constructive ownership of
stock, are both highly intricate provisions, added in the
1954 Code. They may present serious traps for the stock
redemption type of plan, especially when a family-owned
corporation is involved.3 5
The danger may be, perhaps, best explained through a
series of hypotheticals. In a recent revenue ruling,36 the
Internal Revenue Service presented a situation which it
ruled would result in a dividend to the estate of the dece-
dent stockholder. In their example, A, the decedent, had
owned 27% of the stock at his death, A's son owned 48%,
and unrelated employees owned the remaining 25%. A's
son was the sole beneficiary of A's estate. There was a
stock redemption plan and on A's death the corporation
redeemed from A's estate his 27% stock interest. Such re-
demption distribution, it was ruled, would constitute a
dividend to the estate to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits at the time (disregarding the partial
relief that Section 303 might provide). Needless to say,
such a result would be a very serious tax consequence to
any estate. Section 302 (b) sets out three independent tests,
any one of which, if applicable, prevents a dividend result.
The complete redemption test was not applicable because
the estate of A was considered under Section 318(a) (2)
to own the 48o stock interest of A's son since A's son was
a beneficiary of the estate. The substantially dispropor-
tionate test was not applicable because after the redemption
the estate still owned more than 50% of the common stock,
since, again, the son's interest (66% of the stock outstand-
ing after the redemption) was under Section 318(a) (2)
considered constructively owned by A's estate. The gen-
See Hoffman, 1954 Code can turn buy-sell agreements into disastrous
tax traps for stockholders, 4 J. Taxation 322 (1956) ; Swados, Death and
Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement, 26 Ford. L.
Rev. 189 (1957); Plowden-Wardlaw, Constructive Ownership under the
1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 441 (1957) ; Leon, The Role
of Constructive Ownership in Determining Whether a Stock Redemption is
Taxed as a Dividend or a Capital Gain, 51 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 568
(1956); and Winton and Hoffman, A Case Study of Stock Redemptions
under Sections 302 and 318 of the New Code, 10 Tax. L. Rev. 363 (1955).
IORev.-Rul. 56-103, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 159.
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eral test"7 - "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" -
was not applicable, says the ruling, since "the relative
stock interest of the principal shareholder [the son] has
not been materially changed by the redemption... [and]
the fact that the redemption is pursuant to a contract be-
tween the corporation and the decedent does not appear
significant for this purpose".
Assume the same facts as presented in the above ruling
except that A at his death owns 45%, A's son owns 10%
and unrelated individuals own the remaining 45%. Here
the redemption of A's estate's 45% interest would not re-
sult in a dividend because the disproportionate redemption
test would be applicable. This is true because after the re-
demption A's estate would own constructively less than
50% of the stock left outstanding,"8 and because the "80%
rule" definition of disproportionate would be satisfied. 9
On the other hand, if A's son dies first, and his father is the
chief beneficiary of the son's estate, the redemption of the
son's 10% interest would be a dividend to the son's estate,
since it would still own 50% of the stock for A's stock would
be deemed constructively owned by the son's estate. Now
assume that A is not the chief beneficiary of his son's estate;
the son leaves only a sailboat to his father and the remain-
der of his estate is to go to his own wife. Still, technically,
neither the disproportionate redemption test nor the com-
plete redemption test would be satisfied. The only reason,
however, these tests would not be met is because of a very
minor bequest by the son to his father. In such a situation,
it would seem proper to hold that the redemption is not
a dividend because "not essentially equivalent" to one. That
is, where the arbitrary rules of constructive ownership in
Section 318 lead to harsh results, the general test should
be used to alleviate the difficulty.40
These few hypotheticals should indicate how compli-
cated the application of Sections 302 and 318 can be; the
variety of situations to which these sections may be appli-
cable and the unresolved problems in interpreting them
are enough to stagger even the most imperturbable tax
I" Treas. Reg. §1.302-2(b) (1955) states with respect to the general test:
"One of the facts to be considered in making this determination is the
constructive stock ownership of such shareholder under Section 318(a)."
"I.R.C. 1954, §302(b) (2) (B).
-Ibid, §302(b) (2) (C). The "80% rule" demands that A's estate, after the
redemption, own less than 44% of the voting stock (80% of 55% = 44%).
After the redemption, A's estate would still own constructively the interest
of A's son, but this interest would constitute only 18% of the voting stock
then outstanding (10%/55% 0= 18%).
40 Plowden-Wardlaw, supra, n. 35, 467.
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lawyer." Assuming that the complications of these sections
can be mastered, still the use of a stock redemption plan
with a family-owned corporation demands a virtually im-
possible feat of planning. 42 Not only must the stockholders'
relationships with one another, their relative stock hold-
ings, the wills and trusts of each, and the partnership and
corporate affiliations of each be carefully investigated, but
also the future picture as to all these factors must be re-
liably predicted. It should be pointed out, however, that
Section 303 on redemptions to pay death taxes may some-
times get an estate out of the dividend problem that Sec-
tions 302 and 318 would otherwise produce. Yet, Section
303 is a somewhat unsatisfactory shield to rely on, since
whether or not it can be used will depend on facts that are
often difficult to predict, such as (1) the proportion of the
decedent's total estate that will be represented by his stock
interest and (2) the amount of the estate's death taxes and
administration expenses. The conclusion seems clear: these
1954 Code sections treating redemptions as dividends cre-
ate a very serious obstacle to the use of the stock redemp-
tion type plan with a family-owned corporation - so serious
in fact that generally in such situations the cross-purchase
plan should be the type used.43
Another special problem for the stock redemption type
of plan concerns the accumulated earnings tax imposed
by Section 531 of the 1954 Code.44 This penalty tax is appli-
cable when a corporation accumulates earnings beyond the
"reasonable needs of the business." Sometimes under a
stock redemption plan, a considerable part of the earnings
of the business is devoted to the paying of premiums on
policies owned by the corporation for use under the plan.
Yet, so far, the penalty tax has been rather easily avoided.
,1 See Winton and Hoffman, 8upra, n. 35, 380.
'2It is the rule of §318(a) (2) (A) - stock owned by a beneficiary of an
estate shall be considered as being owned by the estate - that provides
the chief obstacle. The use of legal life estates or revocable trusts in the
estate planning of stockholders whose stock is to be redeemed on their
deaths may sometimes provide a means of escape from this rule; Hoffman,
8upra, n. 35, 327. Treas. Reg. §1-318-3 (1955) to the effect that a person
shall no longer be considered a beneficiary after he has received all the
property bequeathed to him may help in other situations, especially those
where the bequest involved is a relatively small one and its distribution
prior to the redemption is feasible. But see Swados, supra, n. 35, 214.
See Swados, supra, n. 35, and Steinberg, Funding Stock-Redemption
Agreements with Life Insurance, 35 Taxes 669 (1957). In Kehoe, How
to use insurance-funded buyout plans today; taM safety grows with new
cases, 8 J. Taxation 156, 159 (1958), it is suggested that it may be preferable
where a family corporation is involved to wait and exploit §303 rather than
to use any stock "buy-out" agreement.
"Formerly the well-known §102 of the 1939 CODE].
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The taxpayer merely lists certain benefits the corporate
entity receives from the plan. The benefits usually relied
on are (1) the plan makes possible a continuity of har-
monious management, (2) the possibility of selling to ad-
verse interests is eliminated, (3) banks are assured that
inexperienced stockholders will not disrupt management,
and (4) the employees' morale is improved because theirjobs become more secure.4" The well-known Emeloid case 6
in 1951 is the leading case using this approach, although
it involved whether the insurance investment was incurred
for "business reasons" under the excess profits tax rather
than the effect of the plan with respect to the accumulated
earnings tax. Despite this distinction, the case has been
heavily relied on in support of the conclusion that the
accumulated earnings tax is not a serious obstacle to the
stock redemption type of plan. There would seem to be,
however, some forceful arguments that the corporate in-
vestment in a stock redemption plan does not constitute
the retention of earnings for a "reasonable need of the busi-
ness." For example, since the stockholders themselves can
achieve the same objectives under a cross-purchase agree-
ment, is it reasonable for the corporation to support the
plan out of its own funds, particularly when a stock re-
demption plan involves the purchase of more insurance than
would be required under a cross-purchase plan? Even
though the entity may obtain some long-run benefits from
the investment in the plan, it is reasonable for the corpora-
tion to devote a substantial part of its retained earnings
to these somewhat remote and problematical needs?4 7
A recent case, Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue,48 may disturb the calm that has pre-
"See Mannhelmer and Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements, 28 Taxes
423, 425 (1950).
"Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F. 2d 230 (3rd
Cir., 1951).
"1 It is true that two Courts of Appeals (see the Prunier and Sanders
cases discussed, infra, pp. 298-300) have recently rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that the tax effect of a corporate expenditure should
turn on whether it was of primary 'benefit to the entity or to its stock-
holders. But in these cases, the question was whether or not the expendi-
ture constituted a constructive dividend - a result that would seem to
require the disregard of the corporate entity. The basic theory of the
accumulated earnings tax, however, rests on making this very distinction
between interests of the entity and those of its stockholders. For an in-
,teresting analysis of the problems Involved in separating the interests of
the entity and its stockholders, see Sneed, A Defense of the TaT Court's
Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 Cornell L. Q. 339 (1958).
" 251 F. 2d 278 (7th Cir., 1958), ccrt. den., 356 U. S. 958 (1958); see
Strecker, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements: Tam Problems in Drafting, 15
Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 18, 41-42 (1958).
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vailed in this area since Emeloid. In Pelton, a 20% owner
desired to buy out the two other owners. The corporation
used the earnings of four years plus a $500,000 loan to buy
out this 80% interest. The court held that the redemption
of 80% of the outstanding stock was not a reasonable need
of the corporate entity, but rather suited the personal and
business needs of its stockholders, and consequently the
penalty tax was imposed. Of course, Pelton was an extreme
situation,49 but it may indicate a shift in the wind. As a
practical matter, however, the accumulated earnings tax
is usually not serious, particularly for the comparatively
small corporation. The $100,000 minimum credit" now
provided in the Code and the inherent difficulties in en-
forcing the penalty tax with its criterion of reasonableness
are obstacles to any concerted attack on stock redemption
plans on this ground.
THE CONSTRUCTIvE DIvIDENI ATTACK ON STOCK
REDEmrION PLANS
There is one more special problem with the stock re-
demption type of plan - the danger that either the prem-
ium payments or the redemption distributions will be
treated as constructive dividends.5' The Government's at-
tempts to treat the premium payments as constructive divi-
dends had initial success in the lower courts but later
met rebuff in the Courts of Appeals. The protracted battle,
however, has left enough permanent scars so that it seems
important to review the cases at some length.
Before discussing the story of the Government's con-
structive dividend campaign, it seems appropriate to ex-
"9 No dividends were declared in 1946, the tax year in question, despite
earnings of over $200,000. Moreover, a majority Interest was redeemed.
It seems hard to say that getting rid of 80% of the stockholders is a need
of the corporate entity that is separate and distinct from the personal
needs of the individual owners.
10 The "Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958", §205 (enacted Septem-
ber 2, 1958), 15 CCH St. Fed. Tax Rep. #37, 754 (Aug. 20, 1958) increased
the minimum credit provided In §535(c) of the 1954 CoDE from $60,000 to
$100,000 for tax years ending after December 31, 1957.
51The term "constructive dividend" is difficult to define precisely. In Its
narrow sense, it means a dividend that is merely constructively received
by the taxpayer. Constructive receipt is defined in the Regulations as
follows: "Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession
is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account or set apart for him so that he may draw upon it
at any time." [Treas. Reg. 1.451-2 (1957)]. But often the term "construc-
tive dividend" is used in a broader, and looser, sense as-meaning any cor-
porate expenditure or distribution which Is to be treated as a dividend,
even though not formally declared to be such by the corporation. It is in
this looser sense that the term is used in this article.
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amine why the Government is so hostile to the stock re-
demption type plan. With a closely held corporation, one
of the popular tax goals is to get cash out of the corpora-
tion into the hands of the stockholders and yet avoid pay-
ing a tax at the stockholders' high individual rates on the
distribution. Achieving treatment of a distribution as a
redemption under Section 302 (a), with a tax at capital gain
rates, rather than as a dividend, with a tax at ordinary
rates, is generally considered successful tax planning. The
conventional treatment of the redemption made under a
stock redemption plan is even more advantageous, for the
distribution of the corporate assets to the estate of a de-
ceased stockholder results in getting cash out of the cor-
poration without payment of any individual income tax.
Dividend classification is avoided because the distribution
normally is treated as a redemption terminating the de-
ceased stockholder's interest under Section 302(b) (3) ; and
capital gain tax is avoided because the estate's basis for
the stock being redeemed is stepped up under Section 1014
to its value at death - which is typically the purchase price
to be paid under the stock redemption agreement.
As long as we have a tax structure that levies a tax on
corporate earnings distributed to a stockholder at his in-
dividual rates in addition to the corporate tax on these
same earnings, the Government presumably will be upset
by any plan such as the stock redemption plan that avoids
the second individual tax.52 And as long as the tax law
treats the close corporation on the same basis as large public
issue corporations, and, probably, as long as the structure
bestows special treatment on capital gains and a stepped-up
basis on death for appreciated assets owned by a decedent,
the Government and the taxpayer are going to be involved
in controversy in the corporate distribution area, and a
satisfactory over-all solution seems impossible. All that
can be hoped for in the immediate future is that the divid-
ing line between what can be done and what can not be
done in this area becomes a little clearer.
"'There Is no fundamental tax policy that demands a "double tax" be
paid on business earnings, for a business can be organized as a partner-
ship and even small corporations and their stockholders can now elect to
have the corporate business treated tax-wise as a partnership under§§1371-1377, added by §64 of the "Technical Amendments Act of 1958"
(enacted September 2, 1958), 15 CCH St. Fed. Tax Rep. #37, 649 (Aug.
20, 1958). What the stock redemption plan achieves, however, is something
significantly different from the treatment accorded partnerships, since all
partnership earnings are taxed at the individual owners' rates while the
stock redemption plan permits owners of a small corporation to get busi-
ness earnings after paying a tax at only the corporate rate even when
their individual tax brackets exceed the corporate ra'te.
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There is a further reason why the Government can
legitimately be upset in this stock "buy-out" plan area. It
is often difficult to decide whether the particular plan be-
ing used is a cross-purchase plan or a stock redemption
plan. It may be possible for the stockholders to escape divi-
dend taxation while the premium payments are being made
on the theory that the plan is a stock redemption type plan
and then upon the death of a stockholder have the sur-
vivors purchase the stock of the decedent with the pro-
ceeds, and avoid dividend taxation on the survivors on the
ground that all along the plan was really a cross-purchase
plan, limitations now foreclosing the taxation of the cor-
poration's payment of the premiums as dividends. Doran v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 illustrates how the
Government can be caught in just this predicament. There
the corporation had six stockholders. Three of them, as
"trustees," applied for policies on the lives of the six stock-
holders, proceeds to be paid to the trustees. Under a stock-
holders' agreement, the proceeds were to be distributed to
the surviving stockholders to fund their purchase of the
stock of any deceased stockholder. The application for the
policies, however, indicated that the corporation was the
real applicant. There were corporate minutes that referred
to the "buy-out" plan, and all premiums on the policies
were paid by the corporation and charged to surplus on
the corporation's tax returns. While the premiums were
being paid, "both the corporation and the stockholders
treated the matter, taxwise, as if the corporation was the
owner of the policies. '5 4 In other words, factually it was
not clear whether the corporation was the owner of the
policies or whether the individual stockholders were the
owners; or, to be more precise, whether the three "trustees"
were acting for the corporation or for the individual stock-
holders. One of the stockholders died, the proceeds were
collected by the trustees, and then paid to the decedent's
estate for its stock, which was transferred to the surviving
stockholders. The Tax Court,55 in Thomas F. Doran, held
that the trustees received the proceeds as agents for the
surviving stockholders, from a policy "owned" up till then
by the corporation, and thus when the proceeds were dis-
tributed to the survivors they received a dividend. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that all along the trustees
and not the corporation, were the owners of the policies,
246 F. 2d 934 (9th Cir., 1957).
Ibid., 937.15 TCM 629 (1956).
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and thus there was no dividend to the survivors when the
proceeds were used for their benefit. The necessary impli-
cation from this holding was that the corporate premium
payments were dividends to the stockholders when the
payments were made; and the time for charging the stock-
holders with such dividends had passed.
The contrast between the way this court dealt with the
ownership of the policy and the approach of the First Cir-
cuit in Prunier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,5 in-
dicates the type of difficulty that the Government faces.
In both cases, there were vague corporate minutes that re-
ferred to the stock "buy-out" plan. In both cases, the cor-
poration paid the premiums and charged the amounts
against surplus on their corporate tax returns.57 In both
cases, the "buy-out" agreement was executed 'by the stock-
holders alone, and the policies were "legally" owned by
the individual stockholders. Yet, the court in Prunier
worked out "equitable" corporate ownership of the policies
and refused to treat the premium payments as constructive
dividends to the stockholders. On the other hand, the court
in Doran, on similar facts, emphasized that "legally" the
individuals and not the corporation were the owners of the
policies and thus while the premium payments might have
been dividends in the past, the present use of the policy
proceeds by the survivors did not constitute a dividend to
them. The Government might fairly complain that the
courts in these two cases have let the taxpayer take ad-
vantage of the sloppiness with which their plans were exe-
cuted instead of penalizing them for it. Thus, the Govern-
ment must often face a difficult problem in classifying the
type of plan being used. This difficulty, together with its
theoretical objection to the stock redemption type plan,
may supply the motivation behind the Government's cam-
paign against the stock redemption type plan.
The Government's recent campaign began with the Tax
Court decision in Oreste Casale.5 8 There a 52 year old owner
of 98% of the stock of a corporation caused his corporation
to adopt a deferred compensation plan (providing a pension
for him beginning at age 65) and at the same time had the
248 F. 2d 818 (1st Cir., 1957).
As far as the corporation is concerned, its tax is the same whether the
premiums are treated as dividends or as corporate investments; in neither
case are the premiums deductible. Thus, the manner in which a close cor-
poration treats the premium payments on its tax return should not be con-
sidered significant on the question of "ownership" of the policies. The
terms of the policies themselves should, in general, be controlling.
"26 TC 1020 (1956).
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corporation purchase a $50,000 endowment policy designed
to fund the deferred compensation plan. The Tax Court
held that the $6,000 annual premium the corporation paid
for the policy was a constructive dividend to the "98%"
stockholder. The Tax Court considered that the "98%"
stockholder received an immediate benefit from the policy,
despite the fact it was still owned by the corporation. The
court ignored the stipulated contingencies under which
the corporation, or its creditors, would get advantage from
the policy on the theory that these contingencies were illu-
sory. Though the Tax Court decision in Casale did not in-
volve a stock redemption plan, its emphasis on the benefit
arising to the individual stockholder from the corporate
expenditures for the insurance and its disregard of the
entity of the closely held corporation caused concern that
these ideas would be extended and applied to the stock
redemption plan situation.59
This extension was not long in coming. A few months
later, the District Court of Utah in Sanders v. Fox,"0 relied
on Casale in holding that the premium payments made by
a closely held corporation under a stock redemption plan
were constructive dividends to the stockholders in propor-
tion to their stock holdings. In 1949 through 1951, the tax
years involved, Mr. and Mrs. Sanders owned most of the
stock of a corporation; they, together with another member
of their family, owned 93%o of the stock in 1949, decreasing
to 87% in 1951. An unrelated employee owned the balance
of the stock. In 1949 the corporation and the four stock-
holders entered into a formal stock redemption agreement
funded by life insurance on the life of each stockholder.
The agreement provided that the corporation would pay
the premiums, and would be the owner of the policies, but
also provided that each stockholder had the right to desig-
nate the beneficiary of policies on his own life. The cor-
poration agreed to purchase the stock of any decedent
stockholder at the price determined under the agreement
- which was the valuation periodically agreed on by the
parties, or the amount of the insurance proceeds, which-
ever was the greater. No dividends had been paid to the
stockholders during the years in review and the earned
surplus of the corporation amounted to $140,000 in 1951.
Lawthers, Weakness in Casale decision; insolvency could destroy benefit
to owner-employee, 5 J. Taxation 342 (1956).
0 149 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Utah, 1957) ; Taylor and Maier, Sanders case
again emphasizes care needed in agreements funded by insurance, 7 J.
Taxation 68 (1957).
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The District Court was not clear as to the specific grounds
for its holding that the premium payments on the policies
constituted dividends to the stockholders in proportion to
their stock holdings. It recognized that the agreement and
the insurance were potentially beneficial to both the cor-
poration and the stockholders, but stressed the benefit to
the surviving stockholders whose proportionate interest in
the business would be increased by the redemption of any
decedent stockholder's stock. It noted the fact that the
decedent's beneficiary would get the full proceeds, even
though the stock interest was worth less. But the court
put its emphasis on the fact that the corporation was family-
owned, and trying to separate the benefit to the corporation
and the benefit to the stockholders in such situations would
be unrealistic.
A few days after the Sanders decision, the Tax Court
decided the Prunier case." There two brothers, Henry and
Joseph, each owned half the stock of a corporation. In 1950,
the tax year in question, $45,000 of insurance had been
taken out on each brother; Joseph was the beneficiary of
the policies on Henry's life and Henry was the beneficiary
of the policies on Joseph's life. Ownership rights in most
policies were shared jointly by the brothers, and, in some,
the exclusive right to change the beneficiary was given to
the brother who was named beneficiary. The corporation
had no interest in the policies other than what might be
implied from the fact that there appeared in corporate
minutes an agreement executed by the two brothers in
their individual capacities (to the effect that on the death
of either of them the proceeds of the policies on the dece-
dent's life should go to the corporation to be used to buy
the stock interest of the decedent brother), and from the
fact that the corporation paid the premiums on the policies.
The brothers tentatively fixed a price for the stock of each
somewhat above the amount of the proceeds that would be
available at death. The Tax Court held, with three dissents,
that the premiums paid by the corporation on the policies
constituted dividends to the brothers.2 In its narrowest
sense, the holding was that the policies belonged to the
stockholders and not to the corporation, and thus the prem-
ium payments represented constructive dividends to the
individual stockholders.
61 Henry E. Prunier, 28 TC 19 (1957) [Dec. 22,327, CCH Tax Ct. Re-
porter].
"Each brother was considered to have received dividends in the amount
of the premiums paid on the policies on his own life.
1958]
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The holding of the Tax Court was not as disturbing as
some of the language used in the majority opinion. The
opinion suggested that the arrangement of the brothers
was not of benefit to the corporation but only to the
brothers, based on the theory that the redemption of the
stock of a deceased brother would benefit the survivor and
not the corporation, in that no part of the proceeds could
"enrich" the corporation since they all would go to the
decedent's estate. The court also noted that the fact all the
proceeds would go to the estate regardless of how much
less the estate's stock interest might then be worth was
further indication of a scheme to benefit the stockholders
rather than the corporation. What worried the tax bar
most of all was the possibility that the court had considered
all stock redemption plans of no benefit to the corporation
and thus that the decision would be applied to conventional
plans as well as to ill-conceived, vague arrangements like
the one in the Prunier case.6 8
Within less than a year after the Tax Court decision in
Prunier, the Courts of Appeals had reversed all three of
these cases. The Second Circuit's reversal of Casale"
started the pendulum swinging back in the taxpayers' favor.
The court stressed that the corporation's payment of the
insurance premium was not an "immediate" benefit to the
"98%" stockholder. In other words, the rule that income
is not taxable until it is "realized" was applicable. To
demonstrate that the stockholder had not yet received
more than a tentative benefit, the court pointed out the
rights that the corporation's creditors would have in the
event of the insolvency of the business. The opinion
was, perhaps, most significant in its denunciation of the
Government's attempt to disregard the separate entity of
the corporation, the court stating that to disregard the
entity in this situation would mean that the Government
could disregard it in every case where a corporation is
owned or controlled by a single person, even though such
corporation is actively engaged in a commercial enterprise.0 5
Then, the First Circuit in Prunier"6 reversed the Tax
Court. The court adopted the taxpayer's contention that
4See supra, u. 3.
61 Casale v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 247 F. 2d 440 (2nd Cir.,
1957), cert. not auth.4 'The Second Circuit's decision in Casale is questioned in Sneed, A
Defense of the Tam Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 Cornell L. Q.
339 (1958).
m Prunier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 248 F. 2d 818 (1st Cir.,
1957), cert. not auth.
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under Massachusetts law the corporation would have equit-
able rights in the policies legally owned by the two brothers.
Once it assumed that the corporation had equitable rights
in the policies, or at least in their proceeds, it quickly con-
cluded that the case fell within the well-established rule
that where the corporation is the owner and beneficiary
of a policy of insurance on the life of a stockholder the pay-
ment of premiums does not constitute income to the in-
sured stockholder, citing among other cases the Second
Circuit's recent decision in Casale. Strangely, the Govern-
ment in its brief did not attack the taxpayer's contention
that the corporation under the facts of the case had an
equitable interest in the policies nor did it question the
significance of such an interest if it did exist.67 Instead, the
Government relied on a broader approach, which would
be applicable to most stock redemption plans; namely, that
the plan was primarily for the stockholders' benefit rather
than the corporation's. As to this, the court first questioned
the utility of drawing a distinction between corporate pur-
pose and stockholder purpose, and then went on to quote
the standard reasons used to explain why a stock redemp-
tion plan is for the corporation's benefit. 8 The court
pointedly refused to comment on what might be the tax
consequences of this ill-conceived plan when one of the
brothers died. 9
The Tenth Circuit's reversal of Sanders0 added the final
and perhaps most crushing blow to the Government's at-
tempt to make the corporation's premium payments under
a stock redemption plan constructive dividends to the stock-
Where, as in this case, two brothers own all the stock of a corporation,
it seems questionable to recognize for tax purposes a distinct "equitable"
interest of the corporate entity in policies legally owned by the brothers
as individuals. (See supra, n. 57.) Even if an equitable right of the cor-
poration in the proceeds of the insurance would be recognized under
Massachusetts law, here the two brothers could at any time during theirjoint lives cancel the agreement and cash in the policies, free from any
effective interference by either the corporation or its creditors. Thus, the
Government had a strong argument that the premium payments were
constructive dividends in that under the peculiar facts of the case the
policies were owned by the individuals and not by the corporate entity.
See Lawthers, Prunfer offers no threat to a sound in8ured buyout plan,
7 J. Taxation 2 (1957).
Prunier, supra, n. 66, 821.
"Ibid., 822. The potential dangers include: (1) the inclusion of the
insurance proceeds as well as the value of the business interest in a
decedent brother's estate, and (2) a constructive dividend to the deced-
ent's estate or to the surviving brother arising out of the redemption
distribution.
"Sanders v. Fox, 253 F. 2d 855 (10th Cir., 1958), cert. not auth.
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holders. In rejecting the Government's main contention,
the court said: 7
"[T]he test of weighing the ultimate purposes to
be served and the potential benefits, as has been done
by some courts and as was done by the trial court in
this case, is impractical."
While it recognized that the corporation was predomi-
nantly owned by members of one family, the court con-
cluded that "the correct rule must limit the analysis to
those benefits 'presently realized.' "72 As did the First Cir-
cuit in Prunier, this court indicated that tax difficulties
might arise later when one of the stockholders covered
by the plan died.7"
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the
history of these three cases. First, the corporation's prem-
ium payments under a conventional stock redemption plan
will not be constructive dividends because the individual
stockholders have not "realized" any benefit at the time
the payments are made.74 Second, this rule will be applied
even in the case of family-owned close corporations; that
is, ownership within a family group will not be a sufficient
reason for disregarding the separate entity of the corpora-
tion for the purpose of treating the corporate expenditure
as a realization of income to the stockholders. The ultimate
conclusion is that the Government's attack on stock re-
demption type plans on the ground that corporate premium
payments constitute dividends has failed and is (or at least
should be) at an end.
THE ATTACK SHIFTS TO THE REDEMPTION DISTRIBUTION
Recently, evidence has been accumulating that the Gov-
ernment has shifted its attack to a new front; namely, that
the redemption distributions to the deceased stockholder's
estate are constructive dividends to the surviving stock-
-Ibid., 860.
-Ibid., 858-9.
-Ibid., 861.
U Moreover, the extent of future benefit to any individual stockholder
from the corporate investment In any given policy is at most conjectural.
For the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining the amount of
the constructive dividend to each stockholder, see Sneed, A Defense of the
Taw Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 Oornell L. Q. 339, 373, fn.
127 (1958).
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holders.75 Two recent cases, Zipp 6 and Holsey," have been
cited in support of the conjecture that the focus of the Gov-
ernment's constructive dividend attack has thus shifted.
In Zipp, the transactions were odd and highly confused.
Though oversimplified, the facts were, in essence, that a
father, who owned 48 out of 50 shares of a corporation,
transferred 46 shares to his two sons and his remaining
two shares to the corporation and received $93,782.50 from
the corporation - this sum constituting virtually all the
earnings and profits of the corporation. The two sons were
charged with a dividend in the amount of the corporate
cash distribution to their father, even though the father
ended up with the cash and the sons ended up with a cor-
poration with very little in the way of assets. The court
interpreted the situation as one where the sons had caused
the corporate cash to be distributed for their individual
benefit.7"
In Holsey, Holsey owned half the stock of a corporation
(the H Corporation), and also owned an option to purchase
the other half of the stock for $80,000 from the G Corpora-
tion, which was controlled by Holsey's father. This option
was made assignable to the H Corporation. In 1951, when
the net worth of the H Corporation was $325,000, Holsey
assigned his option to the H Corporation, which then exer-
cised the option, distributing $80,000 to the G Corporation
for its H Corporation stock. Holsey thus became sole owner
of the H Corporation, now worth $245,000. That is, before
the exercise of the option, Holsey's stock interest was worth
See Hobbet, The New Attack on Stock Redemptions, 35 Taxes 830
(1957); Lawthers, IRS continuing attack on insured redemptions despite
court setbacks; Sanders rever8ed, 8 J. Taxation 322 (1958) ; Jones, How
Stock Redemptions Prodvce Dividend Income, 36 Taxes 437 (1958); and
Note, Stock Redemptions in Close Corporations: A Plan for Taxation, 67
Yale L. J. 112 (1957).
"Zipp v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 259 F. 2d 119 (6th Cir., 1958), aff'g. 28 TC
314 (1957) [Dec. 22,358, CCH Tax Ot. Reporter]. Note, Zipp afirmed: suc-
cessor stockholder taxed on constructive dividend, 9 J. Taxation 39 (1958).
7Joseph R. Holsey, 28 TC 962 (1957) [Dec. 22,522, CCH Tax Ct. Re-
porter], on appeal to 3rd Circuit.
" As between the father and his sons, it might have been fairer to charge
the father with the dividend, treating the simultaneous transfer of the
virtually valueless stock to the sons as either a gift or a sale. The mixed
up plan that was used, where the sons got the stock but the corporation
paid the purchase price, made the situation a hopeless one for the tax-
payers. Cf. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F. 2d 914 (6th Cir., 1954) in which the
redemption technique was successfully used In a purchase of the stock of
a close corporation. The Government has accepted -the decision, Rev.-Rul.
54-458, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 167. With the enactment of §§302 and 318 of the
I.R.C. of 1954, however, it is doubtful that the redemption technique can
still be successfully used In a fact situation similar to Zipp - to get cash
to the father and shift ownership of the business to the sons.
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$162,500, while after the exercise of this valuable option,
his stock interest was worth $245,000 (an increase in value
of $82,500). The Tax Court held that Holsey received as
a result of the redemption a constructive dividend of
$80,000.,
In its opinion, the Tax Court first referred to the line
of cases holding that when a stockholder's personal obliga-
tion to purchase stock is discharged through a corporate
redemption of the stock the stockholder receives a dividend.
But here Holsey did not have a personal obligation to
purchase the outstanding half interest; he merely had an
option. 9 Recognizing this difficulty, the Tax Court then
shifted to the "benefit" and "net effect" tests; concluding
that the redemption was primarily for Holsey's personal
benefit and the "net effect" of the transaction was a divi-
dend to him in the amount distributed to the G Corpora-
tion in redemption of its H Corporation stock. The Tax
Court's discussion of benefit and its weighing of the re-
spective benefits flowing to the entity and to the individual
stockholder is the same basic approach it used in the Casale
and Prunier cases and that the District Court used in
Sanders. Holsey has been appealed to the Third Circuit. In
view of the fate of Casale, Prunier and Sanders in the
Courts of Appeals, where the weighing of benefits approach
was clearly rejected, it seems unlikely that the Third Cir-
cuit"° will affirm the Tax Court; and if it does affirm, it
probably will not use the Tax Court's benefit theory."'
9The Tax Court recognized that its decision was basically contra to the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
226 F. 2d 177 (1955), and expressly declined to follow it. Moreover, the
facts in Tucker presented a situation easier to tax on the discharge of
personal obligation theory than that in Holsey. The Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, refused to look through the complicated form of the transaction in
Tucker and thus failed to recognize the force of the discharge of personal
obligation argument in that case.
8 The Third Circuit is the circuit that decided Emeloid Co. v. Commis-
sioner, discussed, supra, n. 46, which makes it especially unlikely that it
will go along with the Tax Court's "personal benefit" theory.
"There are three other routes that might be used to reach the result
reached by the Tax Court: (1) the theory of Comm'r. v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U. S. 331 (1945), that once a transaction is started it is too late to shift
the form of the transaction to minimize the tax consequences; (2) the
theory that Holsey's gratuitous assignment of the option to the corporation
was a sham and should be ignored for tax purposes; or (3) the theory of
Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956), that the exercise of the
option resulted in a benefit in the form of compensation to Holsey from
the grantor of the valuable option, the G Corporation, of which Holsey was
a director. See Hobbet, 8upra, n. 75.
Supplemental Note: After this article was written, the Third Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, Joseph R. Holsey, 58-2 USTC 9816 (3rd Cir.,
1958). The court recognized that Holsey was indirectly benefited by the
redemption "since the redemption was for less than book value and he
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Can the Government successfully apply the theories
underlying the Zipp and Holsey cases to the conventional
stock redemption plan? When a stockholder dies, there
clearly is a distribution of corporate assets.2 But the major
difficulty with the Government's position is its attempt to
tax this distribution to the surviving stockholders, who are
not the persons who receive the redemption distribution.
The Government seeks to overcome this problem, or at
least it did in Holsey, by claiming that the redemption dis-
tribution is really for the benefit of the surviving stock-
holders. But it just is not true that the survivors are bene-
fited to the extent of the redemption distribution. Assume
X and Y each own one-half of a corporation. X dies and
the corporation purchases X's shares for a price equal to
half of the net worth of the corporation. Value-wise, Y,
the survivor, is not benefited. Treating the corporate net
worth as equivalent to an apple, the change in Y's position
is from owning one-half of an apple to owning all of an
apple half as big. This is a change but not a gain. It has
been contended, however, that the increased control over
the corporation that the surviving stockholders acquire by
reason of the stock redemption is a sufficient benefit on
which to base a tax. 3 The difficulty with treating this in-
creased control as a taxable benefit to the survivors lies
in valuing such a benefit in monetary terms. Moreover,
even assuming a situation where there is a benefit measur-
able in dollars inuring to the survivors, such as where the
redemption price is lower than the true value of the stock
redeemed, taxing such a benefit at the time of the redemp-
tion runs counter to the rule that gain must be "realized"
before it can be taxed. The benefit to the survivors is still
became sole stockholder", but it reversed the Tax Court because such
benefits were not yet "realized" and thus not presently taxable. One Judge
dissented on the theory that the assignment of the option to the corpora-
tion was a "sham". The majority, however, sidestepped the "sham" theory
on the ground that the Tax Court had made no explicit finding that the
assignment of the option was a sham.
On October 30, 1958, in Technical Information Release No. 109, 58 CCH
6780, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it would follow the
3rd Circuit decision in Holsey. The following paragraph of the release
seems particularly significant:
"In the future, IRS stated it will not treat the purchase by a corpora-
tion of one shareholder's stock as a dividend to the remaining share-
holders merely because their percentage interests in the corporation
are increased."
In this respect the Government is in a better position than it was in
trying to treat the premium payments as a constructive dividend (See
8upra, p. 300).
UNote, 67 Yale L. J. 112 (1957).
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in the form of an appreciation in the value of their stock
interest."4
Another proposition that seems to underlie the Tax Court
decision in Holsey is that when a corporation redeems a
deceased stockholder's stock the net effect of the transaction
is the same as if the survivors had received dividends and
used them to purchase the stock, and that, consequently,
a corporate redemption should be treated in the same way
that a dividend plus survivors' purchase would be." Tax-
ing the survivors on such a theory would violate the gen-
erally recognized principle that when a taxpayer has two
ways to achieve a result he can use that method that will
minimize his taxes, at least where both ways are statu-
torily recognized as legitimate. This "rough road is the
only right road" argument seems particularly inappropriate
here, now that the 1954 Code has considerably expanded
the dividend treatment of redemption distributions to the
recipients (the effect of Section 302 in conjunction with
Section 318).86 Where Congress has charted a comprehen-
sive scheme to tax redemption distributions as dividends
to the recipients in certain situations, a scheme devised with
closely held family corporations clearly in mind, it would
seem to flout legislative intent to improvise judicially a
scheme to tax the surviving stockholders in such situa-
tions. It seems a reasonably safe conclusion that the con-
ventional stock redemption plan has little to fear from the
Government's latest constructive dividend theory.
So far, then, the Government has not successfully ap-
plied either of its constructive dividend approaches to a
conventional stock redemption plan. Nevertheless, these
recent cases contain warnings that anyone contemplating
a stock redemption type plan should take to heart; namely,
(1) the corporation should have all the incidents of owner-
ship in the policies, (2) the price for the stock interest to
be redeemed should be determined by a method that is
calculated to produce a figure that is reasonably close to
its true value at that time, (3) there should be no attempt
to insulate the policies from corporate creditors, and (4)
any family corporation situation is especially delicate."
I" In Sanders v. Fox, 253 F. 2d 855, 859 (10th Cir., 1958), cert. not auth.,
the court pointed out that realization "has never been held to Include
simple appreciation of stock value whether caused by internal corporate-
stockholder buy-out agreements or ordinary corporate prosperity."
8 Hobbet, The New Attack on Stock Redemption, 35 Taxes 830, 837
(1957).
Ibid., 841.See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 706 (1958).
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It is true that the ignoring of one or more of these warnings
may not result in constructive dividends being assessed;
such is the teaching of the recent decisions in the Courts of
Appeals. But good planning usually requires avoidance of
litigation"s and not just ultimate success. Moreover, the in-
discriminate or inept use of the stock redemption type plan
may, as we have seen, involve tax dangers much more
serious than the constructive dividend theories now are. 9
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, is it possible to set out any guides on
the choice of the best type of stock "buy-out" plan for a
given situation? A stock redemption type plan is clearly
appropriate where: (1) the stockholders are in higher tax
brackets than the corporation, or it is impractical for them
to get more money out of the corporation by way of salaries,
(2) there are no serious "accumulated earnings" tax prob-
lems now or in the forseeable future, (3) there are more
than three stockholders in the picture, (4) stock redemp-
tion is feasible under the applicable corporation law, and
(5) the corporation is not family-owned. On the other
hand, if all five of the above factors are adverse, then a
cross-purchase plan would be the type indicated. As to
situations in between, when some factors point one way
and others the other way (unfortunately most situations),
the choice of the type of plan depends on a careful analysis
of the facts and assessment of the applicable law and a deli-
cate weighing of the factors pro and con. Therefore, it is
difficult to state any general conclusion as to the best type
of plan; but perhaps the following observations are appro-
priate: the tendency to use a stock redemption plan merely
because it is simpler to establish and easier to "sell" to
the parties should be restrained; the advantages of the
cross-purchase type of agreement should be given full con-
sideration; and, above all, in the initial decision as to
whether or not to have any stock "buy-out" plan and in any
choice as to type of plan, the many factors involved should
be carefully canvassed before action is taken.
Lawthers, IRS continuing attack on insured redemptions despite court
8et-backs; Sanders reversed, 8 J. Taxation 322, 325 (1958) concludes:
"[T]he cases [the Government] will be willing to litigate will involve cor-
porations controlled by one individual or a family, or those involving
unusual procedures or circumstances."
"The agreement may be attacked at the time of the estate tax valuation
of a decedent's stock (see supra, p. 281, et seq.); or §§302 and 318 may
entrap the estate of a decedent stockholder in a dividend problem (see
supra, p. 288, et seq.).
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